I I think think you you have have presented presented us us with with a a thought-provoking thought-provoking and and very very ambitious ambitious paper. paper. I I think think you you have have conf.ronted conf.ronted a a problem problem which which we we all all know know very very well, well, which which is is that that we we really really need need 400 400 pages pages for for what what we we have have to to say say but but are are limited limited to to 16, 16, and and as as a a consequence, consequence, sane sane of of the the detail, detail, the the explanations, explanations, the the thoroughness thoroughness that that we we want want just just cannot cannot be be there. there.
So, So, what what I I will will do do is is make make sane sane COIlIllents COIlIllents and and raise raise a a few few questions questions about about sane sane of of the the major major points points in in the the paper paper in in order order to to allow allow us us to to take take a a closer closer look look at at the.'ll. the.'ll.
I I want want to to be.Jin be.Jin by by surrmarizing surrmarizing what what I I understand understand to to be be the the major major thrust thrust of of yow:' yow:'
arguments. arguments.
The The thesis thesis is is that that parental parental par par tiality tiality justifies justifies xenograft. xenograft.
You You put put it it in in very very plain plain English. English.
You You say, say, "
The "The answer answer to to the the question, question, Is Is xenograft xenograft imnoral? imnoral? depends depends on on who who is is asking. asking.
If If the the question question is is put put on on behalf behalf of of parents parents struggling struggling to to save save their their child child I I s s life, life, the the answer, answer, as as best best I I can can see, see, is is No." No."
So So you you then then take take upon upon yourself yourself two two tasks: tasks: (1) (1) showing showing why why parental parental partiality partiality is is preferable preferable to to other other moral moral stances--i.ilcluding stances--i.ilcluding impartial impartial reason, reason, species species partiality, partiality, utili utili tarianism, tarianism, or or a a theory theory of of rights--and rights--and (2) (2) the the task task of of showing showing how how parental parental partiality partiality jus jus tifies tifies xenograft. xenograft. I I want want to to cemnent cemnent first first on on a a few few points points you you make make in in comparing comparing parental parental partiality partiality to to other other moral moral stances. stances. application application but but not not in in its its assignment assignment of of relative relative values values to to humans humans and and non-humans. non-humans. think think this this is is a a very very important important point point that that often often gets gets overlooked. overlooked.
It It is is fine fine and and gocrl gocrl to to include include aTJ.imals--rnore aTJ.imals--rnore accurately, accurately, some some species species of of animals--in animals--in the the moral moral community, community, so so that that their their interests interests will will be be taken taken into into account account in in making making ITDral ITDral decisions. decisions.
But, But, in in the the distribution distribution of of utilities utilities and and even even more more so so in in the the distribution distribution of of disutilities, disutilities, the the animals animals lose. lose. They They lose lose precisely precisely because because of of the the assmnptions assmnptions about about the the comparable comparable worth worth or or value value of of humans humans and and animals. animals.
The The usual usual as as sumption sumption or or determination determination is is that that human human life life is is more more valuable valuable than than animal animal life life according according to to some some criterion criterion or or other, other, and and therefore therefore the the general general good good of of the the community community is is increased increased by by letting letting the the animals animals suffer suffer for for the the sake sake of of the the humans. humans. I I think think your your description description of of this this parti parti ality ality in in utilitarianism utilitarianism is is exactly exactly right, right, and and I I am am glad glad you you pointed pointed it it out. out. I I agree agree with with you you that that that that happens. happens. I I do do not not agree, agree, however, however, with with your your dis dis cussion cussion about about the the comparable comparable worth worth problem problem the the difficulties difficulties of of canparing canparing human human and and ani ani mal mal life-and life-and where where the the difficulties difficulties in in that that problem problem leave leave us. us. You You say say that that because because there there are are facts facts about about the the subjective subjective experiences experiences of of animals animals which which we we do do not not know know and and cannot cannot know know --what --what it it is is like like to to be be a a dog dog or or a a dolphin, dolphin, for for example-tl1at example-tl1at "we "we have have no no reason reason for for holding holding that that our our experiences experiences are are more more signi signi ficant ficant than than those those open open to to animals, animals, but but nei nei ther ther will will we we have have any any reason reason for for thinking thinking that that theirs theirs are are equal equal or or greater greater in in signifi signifi cance cance than than ours." ours." Then Then you you add, add, "If "If this this is is what what we we are are stuck stuck with, with, tllen tllen it it seems seems that that there there are are no no good good reasons reasons to to move move us us off off our our species species partialities." partialities." In In other other words, words, since since we we do do not not know know and and cannot cannot know know the the subjective subjective experiences experiences of of other other species, species, we we might might as as well well be be partial partial to to our our own own species. species.
First First of of all, all, it it is is not not clear clear why why b'1at b'1at would would follC7N, follC7N, how how ignorance ignorance about about other other spe spe cies cies implies implies the the justifiability justifiability of of partiality partiality for for our our own own species. species. But But more more importantly, importantly, do do not not think think it it is is true true that that we we are are so so ignor ignor ant. ant.
What What we we know know and and can can know know about about the the subjective subjective experiences experiences of of other other animals animals are are
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is is I I --"I epistem:>logical ooncerns. ooncerns. As As epistem:>lo episterrological an an episterrolo gist, gist, there there is is nothing nothing I I would would like like better better than than to to spend spend several several hours hours telling telling you you why why I I think think we we do do know know and and can can know know about about the the subjective subjective experiences experiences (or (or mental mental states) states) of of some some other other aniroals. animals. But, But, since since I I have have only only a a few few minutes, minutes, I I will will just just briefly briefly say say first first that that I I think think we we have have to to consider consider what what we we can can know know about about subjective subjective experiences experiences of of animals animals on on a a species species by by species species basis. basis.
There There are are epistem:>logically arrong arrong episterrologically relevant relevant differences differences species species that that necessitate necessitate our our considering considering questions questions about about mental mental states states species species by by species. species.
In In the the case case of of xenograft, xenograft, we we are are talking talking about about the the use use of of prirrates, prirrates, including including chimpan chimpan Iflysiological zees zees because because of of their their Illysiological similari similari ty ty to to humans. humans.
That That similarily similarily is is one one reason reason we we can can know know sanething sanething about about the the mental mental states states (such (such as as pain) pain) of of chimpanzees, chimpanzees, for for example. example. Given Given the the similarity similarity of of human human and and chimpanzee chimpanzee Iflysiology, Illysiology, includi.ng includi.ng neurophysiology, neurophysiology, we we can can do do what what we we do do in in the the case case of of other other humans, humans, which which is is to to make make inferences inferences about about others' others I pain pain by by analogy analogy to to our our own own case. case.
There There are are good good reasons reasons to to believe believe that that ch:L'lIpanZees' chi..'lIpanZees I experiences experiences of of pain pain are are very very similar similar to to hu hu mans'
Furtherrrore, Furthermore, with with mans I experiences experiences of of pain. pain. chimpanzees chimpanzees and and gorillas, gorillas, we we know know something something about about their their subjective subjective experiences experiences because because they they have have told told us. us.
Washoe Washoe and and Koko Koko are are good good priroates examples examples of of prirrates who who have have described described their their own own subjective subjective experiences experiences for for us. us.
But But I I want want to to hasten hasten to to add add that that while while I I think think we we can can and and do do know know sanething something about about the the a11imals, subjective subjective experiences experiences of of some some other other d11imals, I I do do not not think think we we ought ought to to purse purse that that know no no alternatives. alternatives. "The "The parent parent has has little little real real choice choice if if she she is is to to save save her her child." child." I I think think we we have have to to make make sane sane distinc distinc tions tions here here between between types types of of transplants. transplants. There There are are situations situations in in which which a a child child might might need need an an organ organ and and the the need need would would not not be be a a life life or or death death crisis. crisis.
For For example, example, an an older older child child might might need need a a kidney. kidney.
The The better better al al ternative ternative for for the the child child might might be be for for the the parent parent to to donate donate a a kidney, kidney, since since the the genetic genetic similarity similarity would would increase increase chances chances for for a a suc suc cessful cessful transplant. transplant. ted ted on on in in the the hope hope that that it it might might help help sane sane other other children children in in the the future. future. So, So, it it would would seem seem that that you you cannot cannot lIDrally lIDrally get get there there fran fran here. here.
But
The The second second argument argument intended intended to to show show that that parental parental partiality partiality justifies justifies xenograft xenograft says says that that if if you you refuse refuse to to use use the the animal's animal's heart, heart, it it will will cost cost the the child's child's life life but but may may not not save save the the animal's animal's life. life.
It It is is true true that that your your decision decision not not to to use use an an animal's animal's heart heart probably probably will will not not save save the the life life of of the the an:i.rnal. an:i.rnal.
The The animal animal in in an an organ organ donor donor lab lab will will die die i f i f your your child child gets gets his/her his/her heart heart1 1 he/she he/she may may not not die die otherwise, otherwise, though though he/she he/she probably probably will. will. But But it it is is not not true, true, as as the the argument argument implies, implies, that that you you are are choosing choosing between between a a child's child's life life and and an an animal's animal's life. life.
The The child child will will die die if if he/she he/she gets gets the the ani ani mal's mal's heart, heart, and and he/she he/she will will die die if if he/she he/she does does not. not.
The The third third argument argument is is that that death death is is a a greater greater hann hann to to a a child child than than to to a a baboon. baboon. Once Once again, again, what what is is implied implied is is that that one one is is making making a a choice choice between between the the child's child's life life and and the the babcx:m' babcx:m' s s life life which, which, as as I I have have just just shown, shown, is is not not the the case. case. For For that that reason, reason, any any assumptions assumptions about about comparable comparable worth worth are are moot. moot.
The The fourth fourth argument argument is is this: this:
If If a a par par ent ent rejects rejects xenograft, xenograft, he/she he/she has has sacrificed sacrificed parental parental partiality partiality to to impartial impartial reason, reason, but but if if a a parent parent accepts accepts xenograft, xenograft, he/she he/she can can have have it it both both ways, ways, beCause beCause he/she he/she can can exer exer cise cise parental parental partiality partiality through through xenograft xenograft and and impartiality impartiality by by individually individually pushing pushing for for reform reform in in medical medical research. research. This This does does not not seem seem to to me me to to be be an an argu argu rrent rrent to to show show that that parental parental partiality partiality justi justi fies fies xenograft. xenograft.
Rather, Rather, it it is is a a meta-argu meta-argu ment ment for for IililosoIilers IililosoIilers interested interested in in moral moral and and logical logical consistency. consistency.
It It is is clever, clever, but but I I do do not not think think it it is is germane germane to to the the question question whe whe ther ther parental parental partiality partiality justifies justifies xenograft. xenograft.
In In conclusion, conclusion, then, then, I I do do not not think think a a good good parent parent would would choose choose xenograft xenograft for for his/ his/ her her child. child.
Given Given the the fact fact that that xenograft xenograft is is not not a a life-saving life-saving alternative alternative and and given given a a parent's parent's responsibility responsibility to to protect protect his/her his/her child child from from unnecessary unnecessary harm, harm, I I think think a a good good parent parent would would not not choose choose xenograft xenograft for for his/her his/her child. child.
The The choice choice of of xenograft xenograft would would be be immoral immoral because because it it would would cause cause unnecessary unnecessary pain pain and and suffering suffering for for the the child child and and unneces unneces sary sary death death for for the the animal. animal.
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